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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Michael Loya appeals from his judgment of conviction after a jury found him 
guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer and possession of methamphetamine.  He 
received an aggregate unified sentence of twelve years, with three and a half years 
fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Loya asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
appealing to the jury’s passions and prejudices when it bolstered the testimony of the 
State’s witnesses during voir dire and it made comments at closing argument to 
engender sympathy for law enforcement.  Mr. Loya also asserts that the district court 
erred in admitting I.R.E. 404(b) information that was more prejudicial than probative, 
and that he was denied his right to due process because of a fatal variance between the 
charging document and the jury instructions.  Mr. Loya asserts that even if this Court 
finds that the errors individually were harmless, they cumulatively deprived him of his 
right to a fair trial.  Mr. Loya further contends that his sentence represents an abuse of 
the district court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts, and the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the 
additional information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On November 4, 2015, Officer Justin Cyr was investigating a report of stolen 
property.  (Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.15-20.)  He went to a house described by a suspect as 
the location where the suspect had obtained stolen property.  (Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.11-
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19.)  There, he spoke to the resident and asked her if he could search the house for 
more stolen televisions.   (Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.20-24; p.184, L.24 – p.185, L.1.)  She 
agreed, and Officer Cyr began looking around the house and garage area.  (Trial Tr., 
p.182, Ls.2-12; p.185, Ls.5-18; p.187, Ls.6-12.)  During the search, the officer found a 
locked door under a stairwell.  (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.9-20.)  The resident did not have a 
key to the small room, but eventually Officer Cyr was able to pick the lock and open the 
door.  (Trial Tr., p.189, L.11 – p.190, L.3.)  Once the door was open, Officer Cyr saw a 
man sitting on a toilet.  (Trial Tr., p.191, L.24 – p.192, L.1.)  He recognized the room’s 
occupant as Michael Loya, whom the officer believed had a warrant out for his arrest.  
(Trial Tr., p.192, Ls.12-19; p.193, Ls.11-14.)  Officer Cyr asked Mr. Loya if he 
remembered him from the jail and Mr. Loya grunted and made a head movement.  (Trial 
Tr., p.194, Ls.13-18.)  Officer Cyr asked Mr. Loya to take his hands out of his pockets 
and sit back down; Mr. Loya took his hands out of his pockets as requested, but did not 
sit down.  (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.21-23; p.197, L.21 – p.198, L.20.)  Instead, Mr. Loya 
swung at Officer Cyr and hit him in the face.  (Trial Tr., p.194, L.15 – p.195, L.7 p.198, 
L.24.)  The two engaged in a scuffle, during which Officer Cyr took several blows to his 
head and body, before delivering a knee strike to Mr. Loya’s stomach and subduing 
him.  (Trial Tr., p.201, Ls.4-23; p.244, L.13 – p.245, L.17)  Later, when Mr. Loya was 
searched at the jail, a crushed piece of glass containing methamphetamine residue was 
found in his shirt pocket.  (Trial Tr., p.229, Ls.18-25; p.243, Ls.5-25.)   
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Loya with one 
count of battery on law enforcement and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine.  (R., pp.36-38, 80-82, 93-95.)  The Information alleged 
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that the State must prove that Mr. Loya used willfully and unlawfully used force or 
violence upon Justin Cyr by striking him, “where the defendant knew or had reason to 
know that Justin Cyr was a police officer.”  (Trial Tr., p.138, Ls.15-20; R., pp.37, 81, 94.)  
Mr. Loya entered a not guilty plea to the charges.  (R., p.51.)   
Prior to the start of trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to use I.R.E. 
404(b) evidence at trial.  (R., pp.64-69.)  The State sought to use Officer Cyr’s recorded 
statement to Mr. Loya of, “Do you recognize me from the jail?” and Mr. Loya’s comment 
to jail personnel that Officer Cyr was an asshole.  (R., pp.65.)  The State also wanted to 
use the fact that Officer Cyr told Mr. Loya he had a warrant.  (R., p.65.)  Defense 
counsel conceded that the warrant information was relevant and admissible, and 
conceded that the question about Mr. Loya recognizing Officer Cyr from the jail was 
relevant, but maintained his objection to the admission of this information.  (2/22/16 Tr., 
p.9, L.25 – p.10, L.8.)  The district court allowed the State to use both the warrant 
information and the jail recognition information, but excluded the “asshole” comment.  
(2/22/16 Tr., p.13, p.7 – p.14, L.13; R., pp.107-109.)  The case proceeded to trial. 
During voir dire, the prosecutor told the potential jurors,  
You’re going to hear from the officer in this case.  I think all my witnesses 
are law enforcement officers, as a matter of fact.  And everybody knows 
that police get experience and training through their official duties, which 
can sometimes increase their reliability as witnesses. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.64, Ls.1-7.)  Also during voir dire, the prosecution asked the jury if it 
understood that if the prosecution, “prove[d] that the defendant punched Officer Cyr in 
the line of duty, that that’s enough for the jury to find him guilty of that charge?”  (Trial 
Tr., p.88 Ls.16-18.) 
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 The trial began, and the State called Officer Justin Cyr to the stand. (Trial Tr., 
p.164, Ls.6-7.)  During Officer Cyr’s testimony, an audio recording of his encounter with 
Mr. Loya was played in which Officer Cyr can be heard saying, “[y]ou got a warrant, 
don’t you.  Remember me, from the jail?“  (State’s Exhibit 1, at 4:12-4:20.) 
The jury instruction identifying the elements of battery on law enforcement, Jury 
Instruction No.15, required the jury to find the defendant guilty if he, “knew or 
reasonably should have known that Justin Cyr was a police officer.”  (Trial Tr., p.292, 
Ls.1-2; R., p.145) (emphasis added).   
During the prosecution’s closing arguments, it talked about the current anti-law 
enforcement climate1:       
Officer Justin Cyr has worked in law enforcement for a number of years.  It 
takes a special person to continue to do this job in today’s anti-law 
enforcement climate.  And on November 4th of 2015, that’s what he was 
doing.  He was doing his job, ferreting out crime in our little town, following 
up on a report about a stolen couple of TVs at somebody’s house. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.299, L.18 – p.300, L.1.)  The prosecution continued along this vein: 
The last thing that Officer Cyr expected to find was a wanted man inside of 
a dark bathroom when he went inside that house.  The other thing he 
didn’t expect to have happen was for that man to come out of that room 
with violence, violence toward a police officer, who was just nicely doing 
his job. 
                                            
1
 The "current climate" the prosecutor may have been referring to was the media 
coverage of police shootings which began with the shooting of an unarmed African 
American teenager, Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, and which coverage 
of similar incidents continued even through the date of this Appellant’s Brief.  Public 
outrage over these incidents led to protests and even riots in cities such as Baltimore, 
Maryland, Ferguson, Missouri, and Charlotte, North Carolina.  See, 
i.e., http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-
police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000/; see also  https://thinkprogress.org/this-is-how-many-
people-police-have-killed-so-far-in-2016-7f1aec6b7098#.pfwth75pa 
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(Trial Tr., p.300, L.22 – p.301, L.3.) 
Ultimately, the jury convicted Mr. Loya of one count of battery on law 
enforcement and one count of possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine.  (Trial Tr., p.316, Ls.3-20; R., p.157.)   
At sentencing, the prosecutor argued to the district court:   
Officers are -- fewer people are applying to be officers anymore because 
of this type of conduct. They get treated poorly when they're in the 
community. And we believe that, for the good order and protection of 
society, a significant sentence is appropriate for this defendant, …   
 
(Trial Tr., p.339, Ls.13-19.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Loya to five years, with 
three years fixed, for battery, and seven years, with a half year fixed, for possession of 
methamphetamine.  (Trial Tr., p.359, L.23 – p.360, L.3; R., pp.183-189.)  The sentence 
on the battery conviction was ordered to be served consecutive to CR2012-9101, and 
the sentence on the possession conviction was ordered to be served consecutive to the 
battery sentence.  (R., pp.183-189.)   
Mr. Loya filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider the 
sentence it imposed.  (R., pp.195-197.)  The district court denied Mr. Loya’s Rule 35 
motion without a hearing, finding that Mr. Loya did not provide new or additional 
information in support of his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.198-202.)    
Mr. Loya timely appealed from his judgment of conviction.   (R., pp.190-194.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State violate Mr. Loya’s right to a fair trial by committing multiple acts of 
prosecutorial misconduct which appealed to the jury’s passions and prejudices? 
 
2. Did the district court err in allowing reference to Mr. Loya’s past incarceration 
despite the fact that such evidence was more prejudicial than probative? 
 
3. Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of 
battery on a law enforcement officer? 
 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence? 
 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Loya’s Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
 
The State Violated Mr. Loya’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Multiple Acts Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Which Appealed To The Jury’s Passions And Prejudices  
 
A. Introduction 
 Mr. Loya asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which 
requires the vacation of his convictions.  The prosecutor committed misconduct which 
rises to the level of fundamental error because the misconduct was related to one or 
more of Mr. Loya’s constitutional rights, and was so egregious that it may have 
contributed to the jury’s verdicts.   The unfairness created by the prosecutor’s 
misconduct resulted in Mr. Loya being denied due process of law and was in violation of 
his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.  Although 
defense counsel did not object to these instances of misconduct, Mr. Loya asserts that 
the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to fundamental error, and this Court should 
vacate his convictions for battery on law enforcement and possession of 
methamphetamine.  
B. Applicable Standards of Review  
  Because Mr. Loya’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in 
constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises 
free review.  City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006).     
C. The State Violated Mr. Loya’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Multiple Acts 
Of Prosecutorial Misconduct By Appealing To The Jury’s Passions And 
Prejudices  
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“[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a 
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 
‘due process.’”  Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting).  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, “[n]o 
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”  
U.S. Const. amend. V.  Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o state 
shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”  
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, “[n]o 
person shall be…deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”  Id. 
Const. art. I, § 13.  Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.  
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978).  Prosecutorial misconduct may so 
unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.  State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756, 765 (1987).  In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial 
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.  Id.  The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.  
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).  The aim of due process is not the 
punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial 
to the accused.  Id. 
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Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, 
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more 
credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the 
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused.  State v. Irwin, 9 
Idaho 35, ___, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903).  The prosecutor’s duty is to see that the 
defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and should avoid 
presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury.  Id.   The prosecutor must refrain 
from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences.  Id.   
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law 
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including 
reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).  “Indeed, the 
prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily 
inflammatory tactics.”  State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014).  “Appeals to emotion, 
passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.”  
State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20 (Ct. App. 2008). 
1. The State Committed Misconduct By Bolstering The Testimony Of Its 
Witnesses  
 
During voir dire, the prosecutor told the potential jurors,  
You’re going to hear from the officer in this case.  I think all my witnesses 
are law enforcement officers, as a matter of fact.  And everybody knows 
that police get experience and training through their official duties, which 
can sometimes increase their reliability as witnesses. 
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(Trial Tr., p.64, Ls.1-7.)  During trial, the State called Officer Justin Cyr, Deputy James 
Benson, and Officer Tyler Smotherman, all of whom were law enforcement officers.  
(Trial Tr., p.164, L.6 – p.169, L.5; p.248, L.25 – p.250, L.18; p.257, L.11 – p.258, L.13.) 
The prosecution asked the jury to make a decision after telling them that the 
prosecution witnesses received special training that make them more reliable 
witnesses.  The prosecution’s statements improperly bolstered the testimony of the law 
enforcement witnesses, which appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury and 
violated Mr. Loya’s right to due process.   
 
2. The State Committed Misconduct By Making Comments Designed To 
Engender Sympathy For Law Enforcement  
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor asked the jury to convict Mr. Loya on 
an improper basis.  In closing argument, she talked about the current “anti-law 
enforcement climate” (Trial Tr., p.299, Ls.20-22), then said: 
Officer Justin Cyr has worked in law enforcement for a number of years.  It 
takes a special person to continue to do this job in today’s anti-law 
enforcement climate.  And on November 4th of 2015, that’s what he was 
doing.  He was doing his job, ferreting out crime in our little town, following 
up on a report about a stolen couple of TVs at somebody’s house. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.299, L.18 – p.300, L.1).  After she characterized Officer Cyr as a “special 
person,” she then spoke about the violence of the defendant toward Officer Cyr “who 
was just nicely doing his job”: 
The last thing that Officer Cyr expected to find was a wanted man inside of 
a dark bathroom when he went inside that house.  The other thing he 
didn’t expect to have happen was for that man to come out of that room 
with violence, violence toward a police officer, who was just nicely doing 
his job. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.300, L.22 – p.301, L.3.)   
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Closing argument “serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the 
trier of fact in a criminal case.”  State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).     Its purpose “is to enlighten 
the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence.”  Id.  (quoting State 
v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450 (Ct. App. 1991)).  “Both sides have traditionally been 
afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss 
fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom.”  Id.  (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)).   However, 
considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those implied.  
Id.    
To characterize Officer Cyr as a “special person” “just nicely doing his job” was 
clearly an attempt to invoke sympathy for him.  The prosecutor asked the jury to decide 
the case on something other than just the facts and evidence before it. 
 
D. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Constituted Fundamental Error 
 
Even though Mr. Loya did not object at trial, this Court is able to review the issue 
as fundamental error, pursuant to State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010).  To show 
fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged error:  “(1) violates 
one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or 
obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.”  State 
v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 371 (Ct. App. 2011), rev. 
denied.  The record in this case demonstrates that the prosecutorial misconduct was a 
fundamental error under the Perry test. 
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1. The Errors Violated Mr. Loya’s Constitutional Rights  
First, Mr. Loya’s due process and fair trial rights were violated when the 
prosecutor told the jury that the law enforcement officers received special training which 
made them more reliable as witnesses.  (Trial Tr., p.64, Ls.1-7.)  Prosecutorial vouching 
for the credibility of a witness through bolstering is not merely an evidentiary issue such 
as when a witness provides vouching testimony.  Instead, it is a distinct form of 
prosecutorial misconduct that implicates a constitutional right. 
Mr. Loya’s rights to due process and a fair trial were also violated when the 
prosecutor appealed to the jury to convict Mr. Loya by engendering sympathy for Officer 
Cyr in light of what the prosecution described as a negative, anti-law enforcement 
attitude in society today.     
It is a violation of Mr. Loya’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to have a 
jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law 
as explained in the jury instructions. As such, prosecutorial misconduct, in general, 
directly violates a constitutional right.   It should be noted that the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated in Perry that, “Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor 
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during 
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this 
impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 
227.  This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court that prosecutorial 
misconduct claims are connected to a constitutional provision. 
The misconduct in this case not only involved Mr. Loya’s state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process, but also his federal and state constitutional rights to 
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a jury trial.  As such, the errors involve an unwaived constitutional right and are 
reviewable for fundamental error.    
2. The Violation Of Mr. Loya’s Constitutional Rights Is Clear And Obvious 
From The Record 
 
The record is clear that the State bolstered the testimony of its witnesses by 
telling the jury that the law enforcement witnesses received training which make them 
more reliable as witnesses.  (Trial Tr., p.64, Ls.1-7.)  The record is also clear that the 
State appealed to the passions of the jury by attempting to engender sympathy for law 
enforcement by commenting on “today’s anti-law enforcement climate.”  (Trial Tr., 
p.299, L.18 – p.300, L.1.)  The error in this case plainly exists from the record and no 
additional information is necessary.  Further, failure to object to the testimony was not a 
tactical decision by Mr. Loya’s counsel.  Where all of the State’s witnesses were law 
enforcement, there is no strategic advantage to permitting the State to tell the entire 
potential jury panel that its witnesses were trained to be reliable.  Further, the State’s 
comments to the jury were an attempt to secure a verdict on something other than the 
facts of the case and the elements of the charges.  The jury would necessarily 
sympathize with a law enforcement officer who was “just trying to nicely do his job.”  
The misconduct is a clear and obvious violation of Mr. Loya’s rights to due process and 
a fair trial.  As such, the second prong of the Perry test is met.  See Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 228. 
3. The Errors Likely Affected The Outcome Of The Case 
Information that the officers who testified were trained to be more reliable 
witnesses and that they were deserving of sympathy due to the current climate in 
society, likely contributed to the jury’s guilty verdicts.   
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This is a case where the law enforcement officer did not do a thorough job.  
Officer Cyr testified that he failed to search Mr. Loya’s front pocket upon arresting him.  
(Trial Tr., p.237, L.4 – p.238, L.6.)  In the dark room, Officer Cyr did not identify himself 
as a police officer to Mr. Loya, other than to ask Mr. Loya if he remembered him from 
the jail.  (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.13-18; State’s Trial Exhibit 1.)  Further, the broken glass 
found in Mr. Loya’s pocket contained only methamphetamine residue.2  (Trial Tr., p.229, 
Ls.18-25; p.243, Ls.5-25.)  These facts highlight the overall weakness of the evidence 
against Mr. Loya.  Thus, the prosecutor’s attempt to bolster the credibility of its 
witnesses and appeal to the jury’s sympathies, likely contributed to the jury’s guilty 
verdict.  Therefore, the violation of Mr. Loya’s rights affected the outcome of his case.  
Thus, the third prong of the Perry test is met.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.  
D. The Accumulation Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Amounts To Fundamental Error 
Mr. Loya asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct errors which occurred 
throughout his trial was sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental error.   
Mr. Loya asserts that if this Court finds that more than one of the asserted, 
unpreserved, instances of prosecutorial misconduct is found to be fundamental error 
that these errors can then be reviewed for cumulative error for the purposes of 
determining if the prosecutor was engaging in a pattern of misbehavior.  State v. Moses, 
156 Idaho 855, 868 (2014).  In Moses, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, “[w]hen there 
                                            
2 As the Idaho Court of Appeals held, in State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 152 (Ct. App.   
1999):   
The greater the amount of a controlled substance found in a defendant's 
possession, the greater the inference of knowledge and control. However, under 
circumstances where the quantity of a controlled substance possessed by a 
defendant is de minimis and there is no other circumstantial evidence of 
possession, the inference of knowledge and control is significantly diminished. 
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is no contemporaneous objection a conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial 
misconduct only if the conduct is sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental 
error.”  Moses, 156 Idaho at 868 (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007)).   
Mr. Loya asserts that, given the multiple instances of egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct, the accumulation of the misconduct influenced the jury and resulted in 
fundamental error.  The accumulation of the errors and irregularities that took place 
negated his right to a fair trial and, thus, mandate reversal and a new trial.   
II. 
 
The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of Mr. Loya’s Prior Incarceration 
 
A. Introduction 
 Prior to trial, the district court ruled that the audio recording of Officer Cyr’s 
question to Mr. Loya “[r]emember me, from the jail?” was admissible over defense 
counsel’s objection.  Mr. Loya asserts that the district court failed to analyze the 
prejudicial nature of the evidence which likely caused the jury to conclude that Mr. Loya 
had committed a prior bad act for which he had been incarcerated.  Mr. Loya asserts 
that district court erroneously admitted Officer Cyr’s question without analyzing the 
prejudicial effect of such information versus any probative value.  Failure to conduct the 
analysis violated I.R.E. 403 and 404(b). 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Upon review of the district court’s determination to admit prior bad acts evidence 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), this Court reviews both whether the evidence admitted was 
relevant to a material and disputed issue regarding the crime charged, other than 
                                                                                                                                            
Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
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propensity, and whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.  State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007).  
This Court generally reviews the district court’s decision whether to admit prior bad acts 
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) for an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., State v. Grist, 147 
Idaho 49, 51 (2009).  Similarly, the district court’s determination as to whether to admit 
or to exclude evidence based upon the potential for prejudice of that evidence under 
I.R.E. 403 is likewise reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010).  Three pertinent considerations are attendant 
upon review for an abuse of discretion: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived 
the issue as an issue of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted in accordance 
with applicable legal standards and within the proper bounds of its discretion; and (3) 
whether the district court reached its decision through an exercise of reason.  Id. 
 
C. The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of Mr. Loya’s Prior Incarceration 
Because The Potential Prejudice Of This Evidence Substantially Outweighed Any 
Probative Value That The Evidence May Have Had 
 
Mr. Loya asserts that the district court erred when it allowed the prosecution to 
play an unredacted audio for the jury in which Officer Cyr asked Mr. Loya, “[r]emember 
me, from the jail,” as this evidence was only minimally relevant to the issues at trial and 
should have been excluded pursuant to I.R.E. 403 and 404(b) where the statements 
were far more prejudicial than probative.3    
                                            
3 The portion of the statement “from the jail” could have been redacted from the 
recording without impairing the substance of the question such that the State could 
have still used Officer Cyr’s question in attempting to establish that Mr. Loya knew 
Officer Cyr from a previous encounter(s). 
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“As with the admissibility of any piece of evidence, where the probative value of 
the statement[s] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . this 
evidence should be excluded.”  State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 477 (1976).  This 
requires an analysis of whether the audio recording should have been excluded under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, which allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”  See 
I.R.E. 403.  Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if, 
inter alia, the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the 
evidence would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  State v. Tapia, 
127 Idaho 249, 254 (1995).  “The trial judge, in determining probative worth, focuses 
upon the degree of relevance and materiality of the evidence and the need for it on the 
issue on which it is to be introduced.”  Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 110 
(1987).  To some extent, all probative evidence is prejudicial.  State v. Gauna, 117 
Idaho 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).  The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether 
it harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict 
regardless of other facts presented.  Id.  This inquiry does not center on “whether the 
evidence is harmful to the strategy of the party opposing its introduction,” but on 
whether the evidence “invites inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning outside the 
evidence or emotion which are irrelevant to the decision making process.”  State v. 
Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604 (1991).   
 “Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to show a defendant’s criminal propensity.”  Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667.  Such evidence 
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may, however, be admissible for a non-propensity or character purpose so long as the 
prosecution provides timely notice of its intent to use such evidence.  Id.  In this case, 
the evidence proffered by the State of a prior incarceration of Mr. Loya was more 
prejudicial than probative of any material fact. 
At the hearing on the State’s motion in limine, the State sought admission of the 
officer’s statements from the audio recording in which the officer asked Mr. Loya, “[y]ou 
got a warrant, don’t you.  Remember me, from the jail?“  (State’s Exhibit 1, at 4:12-
4:20.)  The prosecution claimed those statements provided “a basis for why the 
defendant responded [to the officer] the way he did,” and that he knew “the officer was 
working in the performance of his duties at the time that this event took place.”  (2/22/16 
Tr., p.9, Ls.15-20.)  Defense counsel objected to the evidence, although it conceded 
that whether the defendant knew Officer Cyr was relevant.  (2/22/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-8.)    
In overruling Mr. Loya’s objection, the district court never addressed the prejudicial 
nature of the recorded statement versus what, if any, probative value the statement 
held.  (2/22/16 Tr., p.13, Ls.10-21; R., pp.107-109.)   
It was not necessary for the State to establish where Mr. Loya had previously 
seen Officer Cyr.  This information had no probative value in addition to being 
inflammatory.  Further, it was only minimally relevant.  In this case, whether Mr. Loya 
recognized Officer Cyr from the jail does not tend to make more or less likely whether 
Mr. Loya knew Officer Cyr was a law enforcement officer.  The danger that the fact-
finder would assume that Mr. Loya was in jail in the past for committing crimes and 
therefore was more likely to have committed the crimes with which he was charged, far 
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outweighed any probative value gained by introducing evidence of precisely where 
Mr. Loya may have previously seen Officer Cyr.   
The district court should have excluded this evidence on the basis that the 
potential for prejudice of the allegations that Mr. Loya was incarcerated in the past 
substantially outweighed any probative value of this evidence.  See I.R.E. 403.  
Establishing where Officer Cyr recognized Mr. Loya from is wholly irrelevant to the issue 
at trial of whether a battery occurred and was not necessary for the complete story of 
the actual incident charged.  On the other hand, admission of this evidence tended to 
work great prejudice on Mr. Loya’s case, as this evidence necessarily would tend to 
imply that Mr. Loya had a propensity to commit criminal offenses.   
In sum, the evidence that Officer Cyr knew Mr. Loya from prior contacts at the jail 
was not relevant to Mr. Loya’s underlying guilt of the charged offense, nor was it 
necessary in order to provide the jury with a complete story of the charge.  This 
evidence depicted Mr. Loya as a person with a propensity to commit crimes in the 
minds of the jury.  The admission of this evidence was improper.  
Because there was a timely objection, Mr. Loya only has the duty to prove that 
an error occurred, “at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 222.  The State 
cannot show the error was harmless in this case. 
III. 
The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of Battery 
On Law Enforcement 
 
A. Introduction 
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 The jury was incorrectly instructed on the knowledge elements of battery on law 
enforcement. The Information alleged that the State must prove that Mr. Loya willfully 
and unlawfully used force or violence upon Justin Cyr by striking him, “where the 
defendant knew or had reason to know that Justin Cyr was a police officer.”  (Trial Tr., 
p.138, Ls.15-20; R., pp.37, 81, 94.)  However, the elements instruction expanded the 
requisite knowledge Mr. Loya was required to have by expanding the Information to find 
the defendant, “knew or reasonably should have known that Justin Cyr was a police 
officer.”  (Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.1-2) (emphasis added).  The instruction thus added a 
negligence option by which the jury could have found Mr. Loya guilty.  Because the jury 
instruction lessened the State’s burden of proof as alleged in the Information (R., pp.37, 
81, 94), the italicized language created a fatal variance.   
   
B. The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of 
Battery On Law Enforcement 
 
 As a preliminary matter, Mr. Loya acknowledges that no objection was made to 
this jury instruction.  Therefore, the claim raised is one of fundamental error.  The Idaho 
Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of unobjected-to error.  
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).  Pursuant to Perry, a defendant must 
demonstrate that:  1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) 
there was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not 
contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial 
rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings.  Id. at 226.  Mr. Loya meets all the prongs of this test. 
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 First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Loya’s right to due process.  Mr. Loya 
was charged with battery on law enforcement.  (Tr., p.138, Ls.11-23; R., pp.37, 81, 94.)  
The Information alleged that he willfully and unlawfully used force or violence upon 
Justin Cyr by striking him, “where the defendant knew or had reason to know that Justin 
Cyr was a police officer.”  (Trial Tr., p.138, Ls.15-20; R., pp.37, 81, 94.)  However, the 
elements instruction expanded the requisite knowledge Mr. Loya was required to have 
by expanding the Information to find the defendant, “knew or reasonably should have 
known that Justin Cyr was a police officer.”  (Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.1-2) (emphasis added).  
The instruction thus added a negligence alternative by which the jury could have found 
Mr. Loya guilty.4    
Further, the jury instruction given was a non-standard jury instruction.  Idaho 
Criminal Jury Instruction 1212B requires, “the defendant knew or had reason to know 
[name of victim] was [a] [an] [name of position].”  The Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 
jury instructions are presumed correct.  State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647 (1998). 
Trial courts should follow the pattern jury instructions as closely as possible to avoid 
creating unnecessary grounds for appeal.  McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 (2010). 
 “A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the 
case before it.”  Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 
(2010).  Jury instructions that fall short of requiring the State to prove every element of 
the offense violate due process and, thus, rise to the level of fundamental error. State  
v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 182 (2008); State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207, 214 (Ct. App. 
                                            
4 The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ordered a new trial in a possession of 
methamphetamine case where the jury was instructed on a negligence standard by 
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2013).  The instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document 
as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged.  
State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007).  If they do not, there can be a fatal 
variance between the jury instructions and the charging document.  State v. Folk, 151 
Idaho 327, 342 (2011); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476 (Ct. App. 2013).  A fatal variance is 
a due process violation.  See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v. 
Chapa, 127 Idaho 786, 790 (Ct. App. 1995).   
It was apparent from the jury instruction that the jury could convict Mr. Loya 
based on a negligence standard if it found he reasonably should have known Officer 
Cyr was law enforcement.  This type of knowledge is not only different from that with 
which Mr. Loya was originally charged, but is not conduct that constitutes the type of 
crime charged.  If the jury ultimately concluded that Mr. Loya did not know Officer Cyr 
was a police officer, but he should have known the nature of Officer Cyr’s employment, 
the only type of conduct for which Mr. Loya could lawfully have been convicted was 
simple battery. I.C. § 18-903.  Unlawful touching or striking of a person the defendant 
did not know was law enforcement would not constitute the crime of battery on law 
enforcement.  Giving this instruction violated Mr. Loya’s right to due process. 
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record.  The law is clear that the 
instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the 
means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and that if 
they do not, there can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging 
document.  State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476 (Ct. 
                                                                                                                                            
which the defendant “knew or should have known” it was a controlled substance.  See 
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App. 2013).  The jury instruction is in the record, so there is no need for additional 
information outside the record.  Further, there is no evidence that the failure to object to 
the instruction was a strategic decision, as Mr. Loya gained absolutely no strategic 
advantage by giving the jury an opportunity to convict him based on a negligence 
standard.   
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings.  While the jury heard testimony that the officer asked Mr. Loya if he 
recognized him and Mr. Loya grunted and nodded (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.15-18), the jury 
also heard evidence that the small storage room was dark, that Mr. Loya was sitting in 
the darkened room under the stairs and there was only enough ambient light for the 
officer to see Mr. Loya’s face.  (Trial Tr., p.188, L.9 – p.189, L.8; p.192, Ls.2-19.)  
Further, Officer Cyr did not verbally identify himself to Mr. Loya or say he was a police 
officer.  (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.13-18.)  The jury could have believed that Mr. Loya simply 
could not tell that Officer Cyr was a law enforcement officer in the dark room.  Perry 
requires Mr. Loya to demonstrate there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected 
the outcome of the trial.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.   
Further, the prosecutor, while discussing the elements of battery on law 
enforcement during voir dire, specifically told the jury that if it “prove[d] that the 
defendant punched Officer Cyr in the line of duty, that that’s enough for the jury to find 
him guilty of that charge.” (Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.15-20.)  The jury was left with the 
impression that it could convict Mr. Loya simply for punching Officer Cyr while the officer 
                                                                                                                                            
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240-241 (1999). 
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was engaged in police work, even if Mr. Loya had no knowledge of Officer Cyr’s 
employment. 
Because giving this instruction violated Mr. Loya’s right to due process, and 
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Loya’s 
conviction for battery on law enforcement must be vacated. 
 
IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Loya To An Aggregate 
Unified Sentence Of Twelve Years, With Three And A Half Years Fixed 
 
Mr. Loya asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate unified sentence 
of twelve years, with three and a half years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest.  See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).   
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.’”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Loya does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.   Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Loya must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts.  Id.  The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
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the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id.  
In light of Mr. Loya’s rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its discretion 
in sentencing him excessively.  The district court failed to consider the fact that Mr. Loya 
was aware of his alcohol problem, was interested in seeking treatment for his addiction, 
and that, with programming, Mr. Loya could likely be successful in the community.  
(Presentencing Investigation Report (hereinafter, “PSI”),5 pp.24-27.) 
Mr. Loya has a supportive family.  His uncle, Vincent Matsaw, testified in support 
of Mr. Loya.  (Trial Tr., p.330, L.20 – p.332, L.8.)  Mr. Matsaw told the district court that 
Mr. Loya is a good person who can be a productive member of society.  (Trial Tr., 
p.331, Ls.18-20.)  He asked the district court to impose a sentence focused on 
rehabilitation.  (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.1-8.)            
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence.  State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).  In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence 
based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”  
Id. at 91.  Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a 
mitigating circumstance.  State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981).  Mr. Loya 
realizes that he has an alcohol problem.  (PSI, pp.26-27, 34.)  This incident, as well as 
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most of Mr. Loya’s criminal behavior, is directly related to his drug and alcohol use.  
(PSI, pp.10-18.)  However, Mr. Loya wants treatment and his goal is to stay sober.  
(PSI, pp.24-27.)   
 Further, Mr. Loya expressed remorse for his acts.  Mr. Loya, in his PSI 
Questionnaire, wanted the court to know that he accepted responsibility for his actions, 
and that he wanted to get help.  (PSI, p.27.)  Idaho recognizes that some leniency is 
required when a defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts 
responsibility for his acts.  State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. 
Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).  For example, in Alberts, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed 
“remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept 
treatment and other positive attributes of his character.”  Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209.  In 
Shideler, Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his 
poor mental and physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and 
drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it 
outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, 
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.   Shideler, 103 Idaho at 
594-95.  Therefore, the court reduced Shideler’s sentence from an indeterminate term 
not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years.  Id. at 
593.  Mr. Loya’s circumstances are somewhat similar to the facts of both Alberts and 
Shideler in that he recognizes that he has an addiction to alcohol, he wants treatment 
for his alcohol abuse, and he showed considerable remorse for his actions. 
                                                                                                                                            
5 The designation “PSI” refers to the electronic file containing the PSI and addendums 
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Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Loya asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.  He asserts that 
had the district court properly considered his addiction to controlled substances and 
remorse, it would have imposed a less severe sentence. 
 
V. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Loya’s Rule 35 Motion For 
A Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His Rule 
35 Motion 
 
 Although Mr. Loya contends that his sentence is excessive in light of the 
information in front of the district court at the time of his April 25, 2016 sentencing 
hearing (see Part III, supra), he asserts that the excessiveness of his sentence is even 
more apparent in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 
motion.  Mr. Loya asserts that the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence 
modification represents an abuse of discretion.   
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.  State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable.”  Id.  “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction.  Id.   
                                                                                                                                            
or attachments including the substance abuse evaluation. 
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 In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Loya submitted additional 
information that he needs additional substance abuse treatment to succeed in the 
community, and an earlier release date may make him eligible for treatment sooner than 
scheduled.  (R., pp.195-196.)  Mr. Loya should receive substance abuse treatment 
soon, to reduce the risk of further institutionalization.  (R., p.195.)  Further, this would 
provide incentives for Mr. Loya to comply with the programming rules.  (R., p.196.)  In 
light of Mr. Loya’s desire to participate in substance abuse treatment to better himself, 
the district court should have reduced his sentence. 
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district 
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing 
to reduce Mr. Loya’s sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.   
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Loya respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand 
to the district court for a new trial.  Alternatively, Mr. Loya requests that his sentences 
be reduced or altered to be served concurrently. 
 DATED this 10th day of January, 2017. 
 
      ____/S/_____________________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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